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SETTING SAIL WITH WRONGFUL DEATH-AN
ACTION DOES LIE UNDER GENERAL MARITIME
LAW FOR DEATH CAUSED BY VIOLATION OF
MARITIME DUTIES-Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc., 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
Reversals by the United States Supreme Court of its earlier
decisions are usually based upon changes in relevant circumstances
or changes in general policy considerations. In the present case,
both factors are seen relevant to the Court's disposition. The re-
sulting law is therefore a revitalization of the past. By overruling
The Harrisburg,' the Court has removed a proverbial thorn from
the side of admiralty-that no action for wrongful death will lie
under the general maritime law. This old rule gave rise to a
heretofore unresolved gap which was created when peculiar de-
velopments precluded unseaworthiness as a basis for liability only
as to deaths upon United States' territorial waters.
FACTS
In Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc.,2 petitioner brought
suit within a few months of the death of her husband, as his widow
and representative, to recover damages for wrongful death from
States Marine Lines, Inc., the owner of the vessel Palmetto State.
Petitioner's claims were based upon negligence and the unsea-
worthiness of the vessel. Decedent was a longshoreman and was
performing his regular duties on board the Palmetto State when a
hatch beam became disengaged from its position, allegedly because
of a defective locking arrangement, and fell into the hold, striking
decedent in the head, killing him instantly.
After determining that the applicable Florida Wrongful
Death Statute' did not embody the concept of unseaworthiness, the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's
dismissal of petitioner's unseaworthiness claim. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari4 "to reconsider the important
question of remedies under federal maritime law for tortious deaths
on state territorial waters." As had writers in the past," the Court
1. 119 U.S. 199 (1886).
2. 90 S. Ct. 1772 (1970).
3. FLORmA STATUTES Vol. 2, § 768.01 (25th ed. 1965).
4. 396 U.S. 900 (1969).
5. See, Judicial Expansion of Remedies for Wrongful Death in Admir-
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finally questioned the developments of maritime law which had
led to such distinctively incongruous consequences.
BACKGROUND
Even a cursory perusal of the history behind the lack of an
action for wrongful death in maritime law is enough to illuminate
what has, until now, been termed an anomaly. Illustrated is but
another instance wherein the law had become anchored in prece-
dent, and stare decisis had been the snag preventing the law from
floating free.
As is pointed out in the Court's opinion, our case law on the
subject was based upon early English legal history-in particu-
lar, the felony-merger doctrine.6 For reasons not clearly under-
stood, the Court in 1886 specifically adopted a rule consistent with
the common-law that no civil action would lie for wrongful death. 7
This was particularly questionable, inasmuch as admiralty had de-
veloped as a distinct entity, separate from the body of common-
law, and since the felony-merger doctrine no longer existed in
England, and never did exist in the United States. 8
alty: A Proposal, 49 BOSTON U.L. REV. 114 (1969), an excellent comment pro-
posing the same change of position adopted by the United States Supreme Court
in Moragne; see also, Day, Maritime Wrongful Death and Survival Recovery:
The Need for Legislative Reform, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 648 (1964).
6. Briefly, the felony-merger doctrine provided that all deaths attributable
to another person were felonious and that any tort action was made subordinate
to the felony. Since punishment for the felony included death and forfeiture
of all property to the Crown, no basis remained for recovery through an action
in tort. Moragne, supra note 2 at 1778.
7. The Harrisburg, supra note 1 at 205. In holding the common-law rule
of no action for wrongful death applicable to admiralty, Chief Justice Waite re-
marked, "We know of no English case in which it has been authoritatively de-
cided that the rule in admiralty differs at all in this particular from that at
common-law." Interestingly enough, however, there had been some conflict in
American cases. While the court in The Harrisburg relied most heavily on the
language in Insurance Co. v. Brame, 95 U.S. 754, 756 (1878), that "No civil
action lies for an injury which results in death," there were other cases such
as The Sea Gull, 21 Fed. Cas. 909 (No. 12,578) (C.D.C. Md. 1867), which
mentioned the flexibility of admiralty to act liberally and to provide such an
action.
8. Justice Harlan commented that,
We do not regard the rule of The Harrisburg as a closely arguable
proposition-it rested upon a most dubious foundation when announced,
has become an increasingly unjustifiable anomaly as the law over the
years has left it behind, and, in conjunction with its corollary, The
Tungus, 358 U.S. 588 (1959), has produced litigation-spawning con-
fusion in an area that should be easily susceptable to more workable
solutions. Moragne, supra note 2 at 1790.
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The exigencies evidenced by Moragne were precipitated by
two developments. As a result of an evolutionary process, high-
lighted by Mahnich v. Southern Steamship Co.9 and Mitchell v.
Trawler Racer, Inc.,' ° the doctrine of unseaworthiness became al-
most identical to the common-law concept of strict liability. The
"due diligence" standard was completely discarded." Mean-
while, liability under the Death on the High Seas Act 2 was ex-
panded to include the unseaworthiness theory. The resultant
strict liability under the Death on the High Seas Act was then con-
trasted to the negligence theories of the Jones Act18 and the various
state wrongful death statutes. In sum, representatives of persons
killed within United States' territorial waters were deprived of a
basic maritime concept-unseaworthiness.' 4  This caused atten-
tion to focus upon an important gap in maritime law.
HOLDING OF THE COURT
In an area wrought with confusion and inconsistencies, the
Court made a careful analysis of the situation and decided unani-
mously that (1) The Harrisburg was the sore spot from which
present difficulties stemmed, (2) The Harrisburg should no longer
be regarded as acceptable law, and (3) that henceforth, "an action
does lie under general maritime law for death caused by violation
of maritime duties."' 5  One of the remarkable aspects of the de-
cision, aside from its holding, lies in the unanimity of the Court.
As is stated by Herbert R. Baer,
It is one of the paradoxes of our judicial system that admiralty,
the oldest body of law administered by our courts, is the least
understood by both lawyers and judges. It is not without sig-
9. 321 U.S. 96, 103 (1944). The court held a rope "unseaworthy in
the sense that it was inadequate for the purpose for which it was ordinarily
used . . . its inadequacy rendered it unseaworthy whether the mate's failure to
observe the defect was negligent or unavoidable."
10. 362 U.S. 539, 549, 550 (1960). The court held that the shipowner's
actual or constructive knowledge of the unseaworthy condition is not essential to
his liability. The duty to furnish a vessel and appurtenances reasonably fit for
their intended use is absolute.
11. Id.
12. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1920). The Act's coverage extends only to one
marine league from shore, thereby leaving state remedies undisturbed.
13. 46 U.S.C. § 688 (1920).
14. No provision was made in any legislative enactment concerning inci-
dents occurring within foreign territorial waters. See, ROBINSON, HANDBOOK OF
,,ADMIRALTY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, § 7 (1939).
15. Moragne, supra note 2 at 1792.
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nificance that in the past decade four Justices dissented from
the majority in eleven admiralty cases, and in still more such
cases dissenting opinions were filed by a lesser number of Jus-
tices who were severely critical of the law as declared by the
Court.
1 6
It is evident that the complete agreement of the Court in Moragne
stems from its recognition of (1) present public policy favoring the
allowance of recovery for wrongful death as evidenced by legislation,
(2) anomalies perpetuated by the past law, and (3) problems of
the past which arose from a lack of understanding.
The Court placed great emphasis on the impact of legislative
policies.17  In the opinion, Justice Harlan commented that, "It
has always been the duty of the common-law court to perceive the
impact of major legislative innovations and to interweave the new
legislative policies with the inherited body of common-law prin-
ciples-many of them deriving from earlier legislative exertions."'
A perusal by the Court of pertinent legislative enactments dis-
played a wealth of evidence establishing a general policy favoring
wrongful death actions. The Court remarked, "The policy thus
established has become itself a part of our law to be given its
appropriate weight not only in matters of statutory construction,
but also in those of decisional law."' 9  In this regard, then, it was
clear that The Harrisburg should no longer be regarded as ac-
ceptable law.
The remaining question became whether Congress, in its
enactment of the Death on the High Seas Act, the Jones Act and
other compensation acts, had purposefully excluded coverage of
maritime remedies in certain situations (as involved in the
Moragne case). Inasmuch as Congress could not have anticipated
the evolution of seaworthiness into a doctrine approaching strict
liability, nor its application to the Death on the High Seas Act, the
Court reasonably concluded "that the Death on the High Seas Act
was not intended to preclude the availability of a remedy for
16. H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT, V (2d ed. 1969).
17. Such policy was evidenced by legislation which specifically provided
for actions relating to wrongful death. The culmination of such legislation
saw every state equipped with a wrongful death statute. In addition, Congress
in 1920 provided the Jones Act, supra note 13, and the Death on the High Seas
Act, supra note 12, which gave to "seaman" and "people" respectively, a
basis for wrongful death actions.
18. Moragne, supra note 2 at 1783.
19. Id. at 1782.
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wrongful death under the general maritime law in situations not
covered by the Act. 20
The second factor producing harmony within the Court was
the presentation by the United States, as amicus curiae, of con-
tentions illustrating the anomalies which had survived until
Moragne. As the law of admiralty stood,
(1) In territorial waters, unseaworthiness produced liability
if a victim was injured, but not if killed, The Harris-
burg,21
(2) Unseaworthiness causing death produced liability with-
out, but not within the three-mile limit, Kernan v. Ameri-
can Dredging Co., 2 2 and,
(3) A longshoreman could conceivably recover on an unsea-
worthiness basis even though a true seaman could not,
Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.23
It was made apparent to the Court that by overruling The Harris-
burg, the situations described would be rectified.
Thirdly, it appears that the Court has at long last set sail
based upon an in depth analysis of heretofore unfathomable com-
plexities and misunderstandings. Maritime law in the United
States developed from "the corpus of traditional rules and con-
cepts found by our courts in the European authorities. ' 24  Natur-
ally, variations suitable to the American theme modified the es-
tablished rules as well as supplemented them. Unhappily, case
law developed like backlashes on a fisherman's reel and the snarls
and entanglements kept getting worse. The Court in Moragne
took the time to unwind the tangles and thereby provided for an
improved future operation.
In so doing, it is apparent that the Court was involved in
major judicial legislation. This is nothing new, of course, and in
quoting language from an earlier case,2 5 the Court adheres to
the view that "Congress has left largely to this Court the responsi-
bility for fashioning the controlling rules of admiralty law."' 26  It
20. Id. at 1788.
21. See notes 1 and 7 supra.
22. 355 U.S. 426 (1958).
23. 379 U.S. 148 (1964).
24. GILMORE AND BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 42 (1957).
25. Fitzgerald v. United States Lines, Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
26. It is interesting to note, as pointed out by the defendants, that no ac-
tion had been taken on a bill introduced in the United States Senate (S. 3143,
91st Cong., 1st Sess.) which would have extended the Death on the High Seas
Act to territorial waters.
1970
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is possible to extract from the Court's procedure a propensity
towards further "law-making." Whatever validity such an as-
sumption might possess, it would be unwarranted to assert that the
Court should hesitate from further elucidation and expansion of
its present ruling. As a matter of fact, the Court has conspicu-
ously avoided procedural issues which it could have decided.
Should the Court have plotted a course in addition to setting sail?
Of relevance to the Court's holding will be a further determi-
nation of (1) an appropriate limitation period, (2) beneficiaries
entitled to recover, and (3) a measure of damages. The Court
took cognizance of the answers of the United States, as amicus
curiae, but did not adopt them. Rather, these questions were left
to the lower courts for subsequent determination. Concern should
thus focus on the appropriate directions to be implemented in the
District Courts.
Since Moragne has enabled admiralty law to float free from
its moorings in precedent, the District Courts should not become
ensnarled with the statutory bases of the past. However, as in
Moragne, legislative policies have always played a part in shaping
the law. It is merely suggested that further considerations might
add to the viability of developing procedures.
LIMITATION PERIOD
Laches has been the traditional limitation in admiralty for
the instigation of a suit. As a guide, courts of admiralty have
usually considered a related statutory provision containing a stat-
ute of limitations. The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act provides for a one year statute of limitations,27
the Death on the High Seas Act, two years,2" and the Jones Act,
three years.2 9 The writer suggests that the courts, in order to take
full advantage of their discretionary powers, use the entire spec-
trum of the prior legislative mandates from which they may guide
their decisions. In keeping with the equitable nature of the mari-
time law, a one to three year base would provide a desirable flex-
ibility so that the courts might give full consideration to the equi-
ties bearing on the timeliness of a given suit.
27. 33 U.S.C. § 913 (1927).
28. 46 U.S.C. § 763 (1920).
29. 45 U.S.C. § 56 (1920).
Vol. I
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BENEFICIARIES
Two different theories have been expressed in relevant legis-
lation as to how beneficiaries are to be determined. 30  The al-
ternative beneficiary method embodied in FELA §5931 sets out
preferences and limitations for actions brought under the Jones
Act. The Death on the High Seas Act on the other hand, provides
for apportionment between the possible beneficiaries.3 2  Since just
compensation would appear to be the legitimate goal of any
award, an apportionment based upon the particular circumstance
of each case seems appropriate under the general maritime law.
Thus, need and degree of loss can be properly considered. In re-
gard to loss occasioned by the passing of the decedent, it is in-
teresting to consider the possibility of extending a right of recovery
to his general creditors. At present, generally accepted practice
does not allow creditors to recover for the wrongful death of their
debtors. This probably precludes a change of such policy in ad-
miralty law, since the mere situs of death would be determinative
of who could recover. Perhaps an evolution of the common-law
(to be referred to later) will encompass such a development, how-
ever.
DAMAGES
What should be the measure of damages in a suit brought for
wrongful death under the general maritime law? Both federal
statutory provisions, the Death on the High Seas Act and Jones
Act, base compensation on "pecuniary loss." However, damages
for pain and suffering are recoverable under the Jones Act, but not
under the Death on the High Seas Act.3 As a matter of policy,
damages under the general maritime law should be shaped so as to
include those expenses incurred prior to death. Special damages
would, therefore, be recoverable and these might include items
30. See, Monetary Recovery Under Federal Transportation Statutes, 45 TEX.
L. REV. 984, 986 (1967).
31. 45 U.S.C. § 59 (1920). The Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA)
provides recovery for the surviving widow or husband and children of such
employee; and if none, then to such employee's parents; and if none, then to
the next of kin dependent upon such employee.
32. 46 U.S.C. § 761 (1920) provides that the personal representative may
sue for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child,
or dependent relative.
33. 45 U.S.C. § 59 and 46 U.S.C. § 762. See, Petition of Risdal & Ander-
son, Inc., 291 F. Supp. 355, 359 (D.C. Mass. 1968), and Monetary Recovery
Under Federal Transportation Statutes, supra note 30 at 985.
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such as hospital expenses and doctors' fees. Logically, this is no
more than an extension of the seaman's right to maintenance and
cure. Also, the burden of such costs is best handled if distributed
throughout the industry, rather than placed upon given individuals.
On a theoretical level, it seems nonsensical for either the estate or
beneficiaries to recover for the pain and suffering experienced by
the decedent prior to his death. After all, it is he who should be
compensated. The passing of the decedent, then, would logi-
cally cut off such recovery. In keeping with developments of the
tort law, however, it would not be amiss to suggest that recovery
be allowed for the pain and suffering of the decedent's benefi-
ciaries.34  Hence, recovery should be allowed for pain and suf-
fering, but the measure of such recovery must emanate from
damages manifested in the beneficiaries. There is also a place
for punitive damages in wrongful death actions.35 This area is
now in its infancy and its proper application can best be shaped
in the relatively unstructured body of the "general" maritime law.
Sanctions for "gross misconduct" should be equally applicable to
maritime wrongful death actions as they are in any other field of
law.
The Moragne case has presented other issues for the maritime
law, some outside the procedural framework already discussed. 6
It is possible that the Court's decision will have implications for
the general law as administered in the federal and state courts.
Given the overwhelming approval of wrongful death actions in the
maritime sphere, it seems that, as a corollary, there may develop
a cause of action for wrongful death in the common-law generally.
Arguing by analogy, federal as well as state wrongful death stat-
utes may have been rendered superfluous. However, it must
be recognized that a statute generally pre-empts the common-law,
34. This is a rapidly changing field of law, and courts have allowed wit-
nesses of fatal accidents to recover for their anguish, especially if such witnesses
were relatives of the decedent. Annot., 29 A.L.R. 3d 1337, 1357 (1970).
35. See, King, Punitive Damages in Admiralty-Analysis and Impact of
Cedarville, 20 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 570 (1969).
36. Questions raised by C.J. Hardee, Jr. (attorney for petitioner in Mor-
agne) in Death Within the Waters of the State: The Moragne Case, a paper
delivered at the American Trial Lawyers' Convention, August 1970, included
(1) Will the warranty of a seaworthy ship now extend to passengers under the
Death on the High Seas Act? (2) May suits now be brought under the Death
on the High Seas Act in the state courts with a trial by jury? (3) To what
extent can the statements by the Court regarding the general denunciation of
the common-law rule against actions for wrongful death be applied to other
areas of the law?
Vol. I
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though in this instance, rather than having statutes evolve from case
law, general law is developing because of expressed legislative in-
tent. In the least, the implications of the Moragne decision sup-
port an inference that any gaps existing in wrongful death legisla-
tion could now be filled.
ECONOMIC IMPACT
It is interesting to note the possible economic impact of the
Moragne decision. One might think initially that more cases
would be brought. As confirmed by practitioners defending ad-
miralty tort claims,'3 it is believed that there will be no apprecia-
ble increase in the number of claims filed. Even though there has
been a significant increase in the base of liability, the fact is,
claimants have always brought suit on even the most flimsy
grounds and are ever-willing to press only slim chances for re-
covery. Significantly, however, claimants are now apt to be suc-
cessful in a greater number of instances. In addition, a general
right of recovery for wrongful death in federal maritime law will
enable suitors to file claims larger than those previously allowed
under state statutes with monetary limits.88
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND CHOICE OF LAW
The "general" maritime law of torts has generally felt to have
been embodied in the English statutory law. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court of the United States has made it very clear that
"the general maritime law is enforced in this country, or in any
other, so far only as it has been adopted by the laws or usages
thereof." 9  Since England and most other nations have long
recognized an action for wrongful death in the maritime law,4"
the recent development in Moragne merely brings the United
States up to date with what has been the general policy of mari-
time law elsewhere. So then, important as Moragne is for the
maritime law of the United States, the impact of this decision on
37. Manns, Manns & Lande, Attorneys-at-Law, telephone conversation,
September 18, 1970.
38. Statutory limitations on wrongful death recovery are subject to frequent
fluctuations and repeal. As of 1968, twelve states provided limitations: Colo.,
Ill., Kan., Mass., Minn., Mo., N.H., Ore., S.D., Va., W. Va., and Wis.
39. Liverpool & Great Western Steam Co. v. Phenix Ins. Co., 129 U.S.
397, 444 (1888).
40. 23 HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND § 979 (2d ed. 1936); Kernan v.
American Dredging Co., supra note 22 at 429 n.2.
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international law will not be great.
What relevance Moragne has to international law must be
measured in terms of the applicability of United States general
maritime law in that sphere. In our courts at least, the considera-
tions for choice of law set forth in Lauritzen v. Larsen4 are the
predominant factors weighed in a determination of which coun-
try's substantive law should apply.4" In that opinion, the court
stated,
The purpose of a conflict-of-laws doctrine is to assure that a
case will be treated in the same way under the appropriate law
regardless of the fortuitous circumstances which often deter-
mine the forum. Jurisdiction of maritime cases in all coun-
tries is so wide and the nature of its subject matter so far-flung
that there would be no justification for altering the law of a
controversy just because local jurisdiction of the parties is ob-
tainable. 43
The essence of Lauritzen v. Larsen is the weighing of significant
factors connecting the transaction to determine applicable law.
These were set out as (1) the place of the wrongful act, (2) law of
the flag, (3) allegiance or domicile of the injured, (4) allegiance
of the shipowner, and (5) place of contract. Of course, choice of
law questions arise only after the court's jurisdiction has been in-
voked. 44
Because a gap in the maritime law of the United States has
been filled, some choice of law problems are alleviated, while
others could be intensified. In the past, admiralty courts have
often achieved just results at the sufferance of conflict of laws
principles. Two areas indicative of such judicial manipulations
and upon which Moragne should have some effect may be charac-
terized as situations,
(1) Where in the past, a foreign court might strain to find
foreign law applicable in order to provide the claimant
with a remedy otherwise unavailable under United States'
law, and conversely,
(2) Where a United States court might be tempted to "find"
41. 345 U.S. 571 (1952).
42. GILMORE AND BLACK, supra note 24 at 386.
43. 345 U.S. at 591.
44. As to the Courts' discretionary jurisdiction over all maritime cases, see,
Admiralty Suits Involving Foreigners, 31 TEX. L. REV. 889 (1953), and Bickel,
The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens as Applied in the Federal Courts in
Matters of Admiralty, 35 CORN. L.Q. 12 (1949).
Vol. 1
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significant contacts pointing towards the application of
United States' law so that the claimant would obtain a
result more favorable than one available under a foreign
statute.
The law as announced in Moragne should have the effect of allevi-
ating the foreign court's problem, but intensifying the problem of
the United States' court. The following examples will demon-
strate those consequences.
Imagine that a foreign court, such as England, has decided
to take jurisdiction of a claim involving the death of a United
States' seaman. Further assume that the seaman served aboard a
ship of Panamanian registry actually owned by a United States
based corporation. Even though the seaman's death occurred
within British territorial waters, it would seem that on a basis of
significant contacts, United States' law should be applied. How-
ever, as a further consideration, suppose that it is within the
court's knowledge that decedent met his death due to the unsea-
worthiness of the vessel, but not because of any negligence. Since
the applicable United States' law (The Jones Act) provides for re-
covery only if fault can be shown, the British court might strain
to find British law applicable inasmuch as it embodies the concept
of unseaworthiness. Now, due to Moragne, there would be no
distinction as to the availability of the unseaworthiness doctrine.
The recent case of Groves v. Universe Tankships, Inc. 45 es-
pecially exemplifies a perplexing situation for consideration by a
United States' court. The court weighed the relevant points of
contact as suggested in Lauritzen v. Larsen in order to determine
which country's substantive law should apply. Defendants thought
that United States' law was inapplicable, although suit had been
brought under the Jones Act. Pertinent facts were that (1) de-
cedent was a British citizen, (2) death occurred in Japan, (3)
the ship was of Liberian registry, (4) the ship's articles provided
for the application of Liberian law, and (5) the shipowner was a
Liberian corporation. Somewhat amazingly, the court applied
United States' law. Of interest to the court was that the Liberian
shipowner was a wholly owned subsidiary of a Panamanian corpora-
tion whose owners were predominately United States' citizens.
Fortunately for suitors, but unfortunately for conflicts principles,
United States' maritime law under Moragne will be even more at-
tractive.
45. 308 F. Supp. 826 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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The Moragne decision ultimately stands as an ideal for all
law to emulate. From a confused, imprecise body of law, the re-
sult emerged as a triumph of understanding, more sensible as to
its subject than the body of common-law which it parallels. Out
of a labyrinth of judicial and legislative doctrine, the United States
Supreme Court has brought forth a contemporary philosophy and
rule that could have pervasive effects. Of relevance to the instant
case, Moragne closed a gap in admiralty law and elevated the con-
cept of wrongful death to its deserved place within the law.
Robert P. Irwin
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